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Abstract
Where and how have precolonial institutions of conflict resolution remained 
intact? Although it is often argued that “traditional” institutions can play a 
key role in managing communal conflicts, little is known about the conditions 
of their “survival.” This article argues that historical, political, and cultural 
topographies are essential to understanding patterns of the persistence and 
demise of precolonial institutions. Traditional modes of conflict resolution 
remain strong where they have been internalized over centuries: in the 
cultural and political centers of precolonial states. I use original geocoded 
survey data and historical spatial information on precolonial Burundi to 
analyze this hypothesis. The estimations yield robust correlations between 
the geographic patterns of the precolonial kingdom and current modes of 
resource-related conflict resolution.
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Introduction
Violence escalated in Burundi when incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza 
announced in April 2015 that he would run for a third term in the next presi-
dential elections. Beneath ethno-political cleavages, local land conflicts have 
played an essential role in fomenting violence in the country. Because of 
Burundi’s very high population density and its economic dependence on agri-
culture, land is a key resource: “Around Burundi, brothers are killing broth-
ers. Sons are killing fathers. And it’s all for land” (Keenan, 2015). For 
centuries, the precolonial institution of the bashingantahe has been the cen-
tral mechanism for the peaceful management of resource-related disputes; 
although the institution has lost its influence across large parts of the country, 
in the opinion of many observers, it remains the primary communal instru-
ment for conflict settlement and reconciliation (Dexter & Ntahombaye, 2005; 
International Crisis Group [ICG], 2003; Kamungi, Oketch, & Huggins, 
2004). Understanding the determinants of its persistence and demise is there-
fore essential for understanding and effectively capitalizing on local-level 
capacities for conflict resolution in Burundi.
Disputes over access to resources are important drivers of local-level ten-
sions in countries as culturally, politically, and economically diverse as 
Sudan, Brazil, Ghana, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Kenya, or Yemen (Adano, 
Dietz, Witsenburg, & Zaal, 2012; Alston, Libecap, & Mueller, 1999; 
Bigagaza, Abong, & Mukarubuga, 2002; Broegaard, 2005; Daudelin, 2003; 
for example, Flint & de Waal, 2005; Fred-Mensah, 1999; Thompson, 2010). 
Across these cases, local institutional configurations have been found to be 
essential in determining where scarcity and distributional conflicts result in 
actual insecurity and violence. Notably, so-called “traditional institutions”1 
have received much attention in this regard. Precolonial modes of conflict 
resolution are viewed by many as particularly effective in settling land dis-
putes because they draw strength from high levels of traditional legitimacy 
and due to their specific restorative, consensus-based character (Boege, 2006; 
Yamano & Deininger, 2005; Zartman, 2000). Consequently, where they have 
“survived,” they are deemed to be particularly well placed to prevent the 
escalation of resource-related communal strife (Kibreab, 2002; Tubiana, 
Tanner, & Abdul-Jalil, 2012).2
Despite the academic and policy interest in traditional conflict resolution, 
and precolonial institutions more generally, little is known about the factors 
that have allowed them to withstand colonial and postcolonial reform and 
retain their key role in local-level governance. Focusing on the case of 
Burundi, this article contributes to filling this gap: Where and how do preco-
lonial institutions of conflict resolution remain socially salient?
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Academic and policy studies on communal conflict resolution tend to 
explain the persistence of precolonial institutions with reference to formal 
states’ absence, weakness, or noninterference (Beall, Mkhize, & Vawda, 
2005; Deininger & Castagnini, 2006; Mercy Corps, 2011; Tubiana et al., 
2012). From such a perspective, traditional conflict resolution is seen to have 
remained intact in rural peripheries where colonial and postcolonial interven-
tions were marginal and where state presence has always been fragile. In 
short, the population continues to resort to precolonial modes of conflict 
resolution to solve their resource-related conflicts because alternative formal 
institutions are not available or not effective.
Such a state-based perspective disregards the fact that many precolonial 
institutions are deeply entrenched in local communities, making them resilient 
to change even in areas of strong state presence and effective enforcement of 
formal state institutions. Consequently, colonial and present-day political 
topographies may be less relevant in explaining the patterns of persistence and 
demise of traditional institutions. Rather, precolonial institutions are likely to 
remain salient in the historical strongholds of the precolonial political and 
cultural systems where traditional modes of conflict resolution have been par-
ticularly deeply internalized and enculturated over several centuries.
I investigate this argument in the case of Burundi. For centuries, the so-
called bashingantahe was the key conflict-resolution institution with a strong 
role in mediation of disputes over access to land. Colonial and postcolonial 
reforms substantially weakened the institution. Finally, in 2010, the bashin-
gantahe was formally stripped of its marginal remaining functions in local-
level jurisdictions. Still, whereas in many parts of the country, people resort 
to formal state agents for the resolution of land-related conflicts, they con-
tinue to turn first to the bashingantahe in many others. This article investi-
gates the determinants of the spatial patterns of these institutional choices.
I draw on three main sources for the empirical analysis: I measure varia-
tion in current modes of local-level resolution of resource-related conflicts 
with an original opinion survey implemented in Burundi in late 2014. I iden-
tify geographical variation in the historical strength of precolonial institu-
tions based on published and unpublished historical works on the precolonial 
Burundian kingdom. The empirical analysis lends support to the argument 
that traditional conflict resolution remains particularly strong in the histori-
cal, political, and cultural centers of the kingdom. Current patterns of state 
presence and capacity, however, are very weak predictors of the persistence 
of the bashingantahe.
These findings add to the extant literature in three main ways: They contrib-
ute to research on communal violence by clearly showing that historical politi-
cal conditions can continue to shape present-day capacities for, and patterns of, 
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settlement of resource-related conflicts. Although spatio-temporal long-term 
path dependencies are widely neglected in peace research, they play an essen-
tial role in explaining how communities deal with local-level conflict. Second, 
by shedding light on the determinants and spatial patterns of institutional “sur-
vival,” the findings can inform recent research that focuses on the effects of 
traditional governance on various economic and political outcomes (Acemoglu, 
Reed, & Robinson, 2014; Baldwin, 2013; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, & Ruiz-
Euler, 2014). Finally, the results contribute to analyses of the patterns of effec-
tive state penetration. People’s institutional choice in favor of precolonial 
institutions exposes the limits of formal institutions’ claims to authority. 
Consequently, the findings shed light on how historical factors can affect 
regional variations in the state’s ability to impose rules that are accepted by the 
population (Tamanaha, 2008).
Precolonial Institutions for Conflict Resolution
Empirical studies indicate substantial cross-country variation in the salience 
of precolonial modes of conflict resolution. For example, in Uganda, the vast 
majority of land conflicts (76%) are resolved by formal rather than informal 
means (Deininger & Castagnini, 2006). In neighboring Kenya, however, 
more than 90% of the land conflicts are brought to informal institutions first 
(Yamano & Deininger, 2005). Finally, Liberia represents a middle ground 
with approximately half of litigants in land conflicts turning to precolonial 
conflict-resolution institutions before they access other forms of dispute set-
tlement (Hartman, 2010).
Such cross-national differences may easily be attributed to countries’ 
social, political, and historical specificities. Similar variations, however, also 
persist at the subnational level. Thus, for example, a survey of litigants in 
Ghana has found that depending on the sampling area, respondents where sub-
stantially more or less likely to turn to traditional institutions of conflict reso-
lution (Crook, 2005). Similar observations were made in survey-based studies 
in Liberia and Uganda: The modes of conflict resolution display substantive 
regional variations in both countries, with precolonial mechanisms being sub-
stantially more relevant in some areas than in others (Hartman, 2010; Rugadya, 
2008). What factors, then, explain these subnational differences in the persis-
tence and social salience of precolonial conflict-resolution institutions?
State-Centered Perspectives
A straightforward answer to this question focuses on variations in the pres-
ent-day capacity of formal state institutions (e.g., Ntsebeza, 2004, 2005; 
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Ribot, 2002). This perspective is based on the assumption that cost–benefit 
calculations determine people’s behavior in contexts of institutional plural-
ism. Adherence to precolonial modes of conflict resolution is more costly and 
less attractive in areas where “modern” institutions are present and enforced 
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). People abandon traditional dispute settlement 
because legal provisions curtail the authority and effectiveness of informal 
rulings, making formal systems more advantageous: The latter are legally 
sanctioned, are based on written, “objective” rules, provide binding adjudica-
tion, and are backed by effective means of law enforcement. Thus, variation 
in the salience of precolonial norms may be a consequence of the variation in 
the availability and capacity of formal systems of conflict resolution.
Although formal modes of conflict management are theoretically uni-
formly accessible, their presence and enforcement varies starkly within 
many countries, depending heavily on the state’s infrastructural penetration 
and reach (González & King, 2004; Mann, 1984). Legal reforms and insti-
tutions need to be implemented and monitored on the ground (Levitsky & 
Murillo, 2009). The greater the distance to administrative centers, the lower 
the state’s ability to effectively ensure availability and enforcement (Herbst, 
2000; Soifer, 2006). Thus, the persistence of precolonial conflict-resolution 
mechanisms is most likely to occur in pockets of state weakness—peripheral 
areas where formal state institutions are not present, not capable, or not 
effectively enforced (Beall et al., 2005; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; North, 
1990; Tajima, 2013).
The main shortcoming of this state-centered perspective is that it focuses 
one-sidedly on factors that counteract and displace precolonial institutions of 
conflict resolution. Conversely, it neglects conditions that may stabilize and 
preserve precolonial practices. In the remainder of this section, I will present 
an alternative theoretical perspective highlighting path dependencies of pre-
colonial political and cultural topographies. Drawing heavily on previous 
theoretical and empirical works in historical and sociological institutionalism 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996), I first suggest a general norm-based argument on the 
long-term persistence of precolonial institutions of conflict resolution before 
I discuss its potential scope conditions. I apply the argument to the case of 
Burundi and address and investigate potential alternative mechanisms of 
institutional stickiness in the Exploring the Mechanism section below.
Norm-Based Arguments on Institutional Persistence and Change
In many countries, colonial and postcolonial reforms may have abolished 
precolonial organizations, but they did not affect underlying precolonial 
norms in a similar way (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Roland, 2004; Streeck & 
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Thelen, 2005). Norms are sticky and can hardly be changed in an authorita-
tive and intentional manner. If they change at all, they change via longer term 
processes (Roland, 2004). Thus, in many cases, precolonial norms may con-
tinue to determine people’s perception of what is the “right” form of conflict 
resolution and thereby affect institutional choices. From such a perspective, 
precolonial modes of conflict resolution remain strong not where alternative 
formal institutions are absent, but where precolonial dispute settlement is 
particularly deeply entrenched in local traditions and culture.
Traditional norms derive their strength from precolonial social and politi-
cal systems that are still imprinted in local customs, myths, and rituals (Lund, 
2006; Miller, 1968; Morapedi, 2006). However, similarly to “modern” insti-
tutions, although precolonial rules of conflict resolution may, in principle, 
have applied uniformly within precolonial political entities, their enforce-
ment and resulting internalization was often not uniform across all of the 
territory. Consequently, I argue that the salience of precolonial norms will 
tend to vary geographically, mirroring the spatial unevenness of the respec-
tive precolonial states.
Precolonial state capacity was strongest in the political centers of the pre-
colonial states and often marginal in peripheries (Herbst, 2000). In the cen-
ters, power-holding elites were most effective in ensuring compliance with 
precolonial institutions, thereby “regularizing” and stabilizing them (Falk-
Moore, 2000). Long-term enforcement rooted precolonial conflict-manage-
ment institutions in these local communities (see also Douglas, 1986; 
Giddens, 1984), and over centuries, these institutions became regular social 
practices perceived by the local populations as the “appropriate” modes of 
dispute settlement (March & Olsen, 2010; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Other 
institutional designs came to be seen as less suitable, limiting the menu of 
acceptable institutional alternatives (Bell, 2011; for example, Knill & 
Lenschow, 2001; Peters, Pierre, & King, 2005). Norms for conflict resolution 
were passed on from generation to generation: “The young are enculturated 
by the previous generation, while they in turn enculturate the next genera-
tion” (Zucker, 1977, p. 728). Strong ideational foundations supported the 
process of intergenerational transmission. Sacred sites were the locations of 
major burial, coronation, or marriage rituals. These cultural centers acted as 
physical manifestations and persisting reminders of related myths, traditions, 
and symbols, ensuring the recurrent collective reproduction of the spiritual 
foundations of the precolonial norms (Lund, 2006). Thus, internalization and 
enculturation were likely strongest in the vicinities of the precolonial politi-
cal and cultural centers and lowest in the peripheries of the precolonial states.
These general norm-based arguments lead to this article’s main 
hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: Subnational variations in precolonial institutions’ persis-
tence stem from the geographical setup of the precolonial state, with pre-
colonial institutions being more likely to persist in the former strongholds 
of the precolonial state, where associated conflict-resolution norms are 
most strongly entrenched in local communities.
Scope Conditions of the Norm-Based Argument
This main hypothesis rests on the assumption that effective precolonial norm 
enforcement can foster processes of norm internalization. This, however, 
may only be plausible under certain conditions. Most important, effective 
norm enforcement requires a certain degree of political centralization and 
state capacity. Many precolonial states, however, were rather fragmented 
with little state control over territories outside of individual political cen-
ters—arguably due to high costs and limited benefits of extending power into 
peripheries (Herbst, 2000; Scott, 2009). Moreover, processes of internaliza-
tion may have been impeded by specific precolonial settlement patterns. 
First, as agued by Herbst (2000), people’s mobility and distribution across 
vast territories constituted challenges to precolonial statehood, reducing the 
ability of power holders to effectively enforce their rule. Second, encultura-
tion of shared norms is less likely to develop among widely dispersed and 
nomadic groups with little regular interaction among each other.
Thus, the suggested long-term effects of precolonial political topographies 
are likely to be strongest and most relevant in regions that belonged to compara-
tively centralized and compact precolonial political systems. I draw on data pro-
vided by Murdock (1967), Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), and Nunn (2008) to 
show that these characteristics apply to a significant population of cases in sub-
Saharan Africa. Murdock provides information on various characteristics of 
African ethnic groups before European colonization; Nunn (2008) has geocoded 
the respective ethnic settlement areas. Using these data, I create three binary 
explanatory variables: one for centralized precolonial entities using Gennaioli’s 
and Rainer’s (2006) measure (“large paramount chiefdoms/small states” and 
“large states”), another one for compact and relatively permanent settlement 
patterns (“compact and relatively permanent” and “complex settlements”), and 
a combined variable identifying ethnic groups displaying a high level of preco-
lonial ethnic centralization and compact, permanent settlements.
Around 25% of all ethnic groups for which the relevant information is avail-
able in the data (386) can be considered “centralized” in precolonial times 
according to the measure introduced above (incl. Burundi); 54% display “com-
pact and relatively permanent” or “complex” settlement patterns. Around 20% 
of the groups fulfill both these conditions. They comprise, for example, the 
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Ashanti in Ghana, the Fur in Sudan, or the Songhai in Mali. Thus, although I 
focus my main empirical analysis on the case of Burundi as an example of a 
particularly highly centralized precolonial state, I believe that the findings can 
inform analyses of conflict resolution in a substantially wider population of 
countries.
The Case of Burundi
Burundi is one of the most densely populated countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Its economy is highly agriculture dependent (van Leeuwen & Haartsen, 
2005). The high value and scarcity of land has been accompanied by persist-
ing neopatrimonial mechanisms of land allocation, insufficient land tenure 
rights, and waves of conflict-induced migration and repatriation, all of which 
have combined to generate conflicts that have often become violent (ICG, 
2014; Matignon, 2015). There is no precise estimate of the total number of 
land disputes in Burundi. The fact, however, that more than 70% of all cases 
filed with local communal courts pertain to land issues (Kohlhagen, 2009a), 
testifies to the high social and security relevance of land conflicts in Burundi.
Land conflicts are officially within the jurisdiction of local courts (see, for 
example, Kohlhagen, 2009a), but the formal judicial system is weak, suffer-
ing from deficits in terms of material and human resources. On average, com-
munal courts are staffed with only eight judges per 100,000 inhabitants 
(Kohlhagen, 2009a). Magistrates tend to be secondary school graduates with 
only 6 months of legal training (Dexter & Ntahombaye, 2005). More impor-
tant, courts are widely viewed as being corrupt and clientelist, which under-
mines legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Dexter & Ntahombaye, 2005; 
Kohlhagen, 2008; van Leeuwen & Haartsen, 2005).
In this context, the traditional bashingantahe institution is seen by many 
as an important local resource for conflict resolution. As a report by the ICG 
highlights, “the bashingantahe institution is the only one whose involvement 
in the sustainable restoration and maintenance of a fair and equitable order 
(intahe) can be useful for the peace process and the political neutralization of 
the land time bomb” (ICG, 2003, p. 12). Similarly, other policy-oriented 
studies stress that the bashingantahe represent a key local capacity for peace-
fully resolving land disputes (Dexter & Ntahombaye, 2005; Kamungi et al., 
2004). The following subsection provides additional information on the 
background and evolution of the bashingantahe.
The History of the Bashingantahe
From the establishment of the Burundian kingdom in the 17th century, the 
bashingantahe were the primary moral and judiciary authorities. They were 
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local notables charged with preserving unity and harmony through counsel-
ing, mediation, and reconciliation pertaining to all kinds of local-level con-
flicts. Etymologically, the term mushingantahe (singular of bashingantahe) 
derives from an expression that translates as “knocking the bar on the ground” 
and from “gushing intahe,” which means to decide something. The name can 
be traced back to the fact the bashingantahe used to carry a stick made from 
holy wood that symbolized their administrative and moral authority (Ingelaere 
& Kohlhagen, 2012; Laely, 1995). Early on, the institution of the bashingan-
tahe was introduced across all of the territory of the precolonial kingdom as 
a consequence of bottom–up institution building and top–down attempts at 
establishing uniform and decentralized institutions of conflict resolution 
(Dexter & Ntahombaye, 2005; Laely, 1995).
From the beginning of colonialization, the bashingantahe underwent a 
process of transformation and marginalization. The Belgian administration 
initially relied heavily on the bashingantahe. With time, however, the 
regime established indigenous tribunals with state-appointed judges who 
gradually took over functions traditionally carried out by the bashingan-
tahe (Deslaurier, 2003). Eventually, the institution was formally integrated 
into the colonial judiciary system and reduced to a mere witness and juror 
in tribunals held under the auspices of local chiefs (Gahama, 1983; Laely, 
1995; Weilenmann, 1996).
In 1966, only 4 years after independence, the Burundian monarchy was 
formally abolished, together with its local governance system. This stripped 
precolonial conflict resolution of the remnants of its institutional founda-
tions. The monarchy was replaced by a military regime that politicized and 
instrumentalized the bashingantahe for its own ends. The institution briefly 
regained some acceptance in the 1990s, but the postwar government—which 
aimed to establish full control over the country—was wary of this parallel 
source of authority (Deslaurier, 2003; Shaw, Waldorf, & Hazan, 2010). In 
2005, the Burundian constitution was reformed. Contrary to previous ver-
sions, it no longer made any reference to the bashingantahe. Finally in 2010, 
with the reorganization of the communal administration, the bashingantahe 
was stripped of its remaining, and already marginal, legal basis (Ingelaere & 
Kohlhagen, 2012).
Even though the bashingantahe was progressively deprived of its orga-
nizational and legal foundation, it never ceased to play an important role in 
the eyes of the local population. A survey conducted in 1956, toward the 
end of the colonial period, revealed continued support for the bashingan-
tahe as the “natural counselor” of the population (Gahama, 1983). Similarly, 
in the postcolonial period, the bashingantahe has remained a respected 
institution of substantial moral authority (Deslaurier, 2003; Ingelaere & 
Kohlhagen, 2012). This enduring social salience, however, is not uniform 
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across the country. Ethnographic works indicate that precolonial modes of 
conflict resolution remain particularly relevant in the central regions of 
Burundi, where the political and cultural centers of the former kingdom 
were located (Kohlhagen, 2009a; Weilenmann, 1996). This specificity can 
be traced back to the bashingantahe’s strong link to the king. The bashin-
gantahe spoke their rulings in his name and acted as his intermediaries 
(Laely, 1995). This strong association is best expressed by the verse that 
was exclaimed when the bashingantahe were inducted: “Receive this stick 
of justice that has been given by Ntare Rushati [the first king of Burundi in 
the seventeenth century] to your father and your grandfather” (“Recois ce 
bâton de justice qui a été donné par Ntare Rushati à ton père et à ton grand-
père”; Mworoha, 1987, p. 209). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the 
institution of the bashingantahe was particularly strongly enforced and 
embedded in the political and cultural center of the kingdom, and that this 
is the region where the collective memory and normative foundation of the 
precolonial order remains particularly vivid until today (Kohlhagen, 2009a; 
Weilenmann, 1996). The following subsection briefly introduces the spe-
cific political topography of the precolonial state.
The Topography of the Burundian Kingdom
In the 16th century, what was to become the kingdom of Burundi consisted of 
two main centers of political power. In the 17th and early 18th centuries, 
these centers merged. This moment has been understood as the actual found-
ing moment of the Burundian kingdom. In the following years, the first king, 
Ntare Rushatsi, began to establish a number of key political, ritual, and eco-
nomic domains delineating what was to remain the center of the precolonial 
kingdom for centuries to come (Chrétien, 1993; Laely, 1995; Mworoha, 
1987; Vansina, 1972).
Two longer term trends were essential in determining the location of the 
political and cultural center. First, recurrent droughts in the 17th century had 
led to population movements from eastern regions into areas of higher pre-
cipitation to the west. Second, raids by the northern Banyoro tribe triggered 
population movements to the south (Chrétien, 1993; Laely, 1995; Mworoha, 
1987). These movements led to a concentration of population and economic 
activity in a region bordered by natural landmarks and obstacles—namely, 
the hills of Ruvubu to the north, the mountains of Kibira to the west, and the 
river Ruvjironza to the southeast (Laely, 1995; Mworoha, 1977). The upper 
left map in Figure 1 illustrates the original two centers of power and these 
three essential landmarks that demarcated the political and cultural center of 
the kingdom.
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Within this region, subsequent Burundian kings established so-called 
“royal domains” that constituted the sociopolitical capitals of the kingdom 
(see Mworoha, 1987, for discussions of the concept of “royal domains”). The 
most important domains were the political ones, where the king spent most of 
his time. Other domains were needed for the kingdom’s economic production 
(e.g., specific pastures). Finally, the cultural domains were the locus of all 
essential rituals, especially burials and coronations. Two largely idiosyncratic 
factors played an essential role in determining the exact location of these 
domains: The first was the location of trees/forests deemed sacred in the 
royal cult. These could have been single, very large, and isolated trees or the 
areas where particular plants needed for the production of artifacts used in 
sacred rituals grew (Mworoha, 1987). The second was the residences of the 
kings’ spouses (Laely, 1995).
The resulting geographical structure of the early kingdom created strong 
path dependencies. Despite major social, political, and economic changes as 
well as the substantial geographical expansion of the kingdom, the location 
of the core center of power and of individual royal domains remained largely 
Figure 1. Phases of precolonial state building in Burundi, 16th to 19th centuries.
1846 Comparative Political Studies 50(13)
unchanged. Although every new king founded new domains, the majority of 
sites were “inherited” from predecessors (up to 75% according to Mworoha, 
1987; see also Laely, 1995; Vansina, 1972). In the early 20th century, two 
thirds of the royal domains were still located in the original center of power. 
We can see in the maps in Figure 1 that the main natural landmarks men-
tioned above continued to define the outer boundaries of the kingdom’s cen-
ter; the major sites of political power remained within these core areas 
(Vansina, 1972). Consequently, it was largely exogenous factors that led to 
the specific spatial pattern of the precolonial kingdom that was to last from 
the 17th to the early 20th century.
Within few decades of colonial and postcolonial rule, the political topog-
raphy of Burundi was systematically reshaped. The colonial state reorganized 
the territorial setup of the country, systematically stripping former royal 
domains of their specific and privileged political position. The German 
regime established its regional political capital in Usumbura, to the west of 
the former royal center. Usumbura remained the regional capital of the 
Belgian colony of Ruanda-Urundi and later became today’s capital city 
Bujumbura. The capital of Burundi and the residence of the colonial admin-
istration was established in Kitega, southeast of the royal center.
The maps (a) and (b) of Figure 2 display the fundamentally distinct logic 
of political organization of the precolonial and the colonial state: Darker 
shades indicate longer distances to the nearest royal domain (late 19th cen-
tury) and the nearest administrative headquarter (1930; “Chef-lieu de terri-
toire”), respectively. Contrary to the concentration of political power in a 
naturally grown center in the precolonial area, we see that colonial agents 
established administrative hubs in a way that partitioned the colonial territory 
into roughly equal-sized administrative units (“Territoires”). Map (c) shows 
that this logic was carried over into the postcolonial period where the number 
Figure 2. Precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial political topographies: (a) 
precolonial, (b) colonial, and (c) postcolonial.
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of regional provincial capitals increased in an attempt to further strengthen 
penetration. Thus, already few years after the beginning of the Belgian colo-
nial period, little was left of the specific political topography of the precolo-
nial area.
Before I move on to investigate, if the spatial patterns of precolonial state-
hood nonetheless continue to shape institutional choices in conflict resolu-
tion, I draw on unpublished colonial sources to assess the underlying claim of 
my main hypothesis that the center of the precolonial kingdom did indeed 
originally differ from its periphery in terms of power relations and the 
salience of the precolonial norms.
Specificities of the Political and Cultural Center of the Kingdom
In 1929, the Belgian colonial government undertook an administrative sur-
vey. The exercise aimed to collate systematic information on the colony’s 
territory. Among other things, it included assessments of individual chiefs’ 
attitudes toward the colonial government and missionaries, as well as of their 
leadership skills and their attachment to the “traditional beliefs” that consti-
tuted the spiritual foundations of the kingdom. The assessments were carried 
out by Belgian administrators who had limited knowledge of the local con-
text and who were deeply resented by many of the chiefs. Nonetheless, con-
sidering the key social, economic, and political role of the chiefs, their alleged 
attitudes and relations to the population provide rare insights into the social 
and political conditions of the kingdom at the end of its sovereign existence.
Copies of the original colonial assessments are included in the J.M. 
Derscheid collection hosted by the University of Florida Digital Collection.3 
The collection contains a total of 66 assessments. I have been able to attribute 
56 of them to specific geographical locations using maps of chieftainships 
produced by Gahama (Gahama, 1983). This allows me to compare the assess-
ments of chiefs from within the core areas of the precolonial kingdom with 
those of chiefs from the periphery. To allow for more systematic compari-
sons, I have created a small data set based on information coded from the 
qualitative chief assessments. Table 1 shows the results of a number of simple 
t tests. Although the results have to be treated cautiously due to the very lim-
ited number of observations and the purely bivariate nature of the correla-
tions, they do allow for some assessment of the plausibility of the argument 
that specific norms and power relations were particularly strong in the center 
of the precolonial kingdom even before the first massive colonial interven-
tions in 1929.
There does not seem to have been any systematic difference across the two 
groups with regard to the personal characteristics of the chiefs, such as age, 
1848 Comparative Political Studies 50(13)
literacy, or ethnic identity. Similarly, on average, chiefs within and outside 
the royal area barely differed in terms of the number of years they had been 
in office when the survey was carried out or the period of time they remained 
in office after the survey.4
However, according to the Belgian assessments, chiefs within the royal 
areas were more strongly attached to the “traditional” non-Christian belief 
system associated with the precolonial political order (80% within the royal 
areas as compared with 40% in the periphery). The survey also tried to gauge 
the quality of local-level power relations. The assessments feature informa-
tion on the acceptance of chiefs by their respective constituencies. Whereas 
all chiefs within the core royal areas were credited a certain degree of local 
authority, nearly 20% of the chiefs outside of the royal areas lacked local 
legitimacy according to Belgian administrators (as measured, for example, 
by the population’s complaints on their chiefs filed with the colonial admin-
istration). Thus, on average, the spiritual foundations of the precolonial sys-
tem of governance seem to have been more strongly embedded in the center. 
Moreover, local-level authority sanctioned by the king was more easily 
accepted within the core areas of the kingdom.
Although the survey does not include any information on the bashingan-
tahe itself, the patterns presented above lend some additional support to my 
underlying assumption that specific norms and power relations associated 
with the precolonial kingdom were more strongly entrenched in the core 
areas of the regime, thus contributing to the internationalization and encul-
turation of norms associated with the kingdom—such as the resolution of 
conflict by the bashingantahe.
The following section provides an empirical analysis of the argument that 
these specificities continue to affect present-day spatial patterns of conflict 
resolution.
Table 1. Colonial Chief Assessment (1929) in the Royal Area and the Periphery.
Periphery Royal area Difference p
Traditional beliefs 0.650 1.125 −0.475 .096
Legitimacy 1.350 1.700 −0.350 .087
Support for missions 0.333 0.444 −0.111 .573
Age 36.333 51.000 −14.667 .242
Literacy 0.262 0.200 0.062 .686
Bezi/Batare 0.636 0.500 0.136 .428
In office before 1929 11.200 7.800 3.400 .132
In office after 1929 5.568 4.083 1.485 .550
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Empirical Analysis
My empirical analysis relies primarily on two sources. The first is an opinion 
survey we undertook in 2014 in Burundi.5 A stratified two-stage design was 
used to select a total of 100 rural communities (based on the 2008 Population 
and Housing Census). Across these communities, a total of 1,500 households 
were drawn randomly from household lists maintained by village chiefs. 
Survey instruments were translated from English into French and Kirundi 
and back-translated for validation. In addition to the individual-level survey, 
we undertook an accompanying village-level survey, collecting various 
information on the sampled communities such as distances to specific infra-
structure, development projects, and local conflicts. The data were collected 
through group interviews with local elites (chiefs, teachers, members of the 
local administration). Data collection took place with hand-held devices that 
were also used to geolocate interview sites using precise longitude and lati-
tude measurements.
The second main source is historical information drawn from ethnographic 
works on the precolonial kingdom. The Burundian historian Émile Mworoha 
prepared detailed accounts of the early genesis of the Burundian state 
(Mworoha, 1987). His work includes a number of widely cited geographical 
representations of the state-building process featuring information on the pri-
mary royal domains and the approximate outer boundaries of the kingdom’s 
core areas.
The following three subsections provide information on the concrete oper-
ationalization of my main outcome, explanatory, and control variables.
Outcome Variables
To measure the main outcome variable, I have relied mainly on one item from 
the abovementioned survey. The respondents were asked, “If you were 
involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), 
what are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict?” The 
first three responses were recorded by the interviewer and ranked according 
to their sequence.
Figure 3 illustrates the response patterns across actors and in geographical 
terms. We see that the majority of respondents would first turn to the chef de 
colline, who is the lowest level state actor (locally elected, paid by the state). 
However, approximately one fifth of the population would turn first to a 
bashingantahe to resolve a conflict related to natural resources. My main 
outcome variable is coded “1” for all respondents who would first turn to the 
bashingantahe and “0” otherwise.
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Looking at the right-hand map in Figure 3, we can see that the prioritiza-
tion of the bashingantahe seems to be clustered. In line with my theoretical 
expectations, the village-level average of people ranking the bashingantahe 
as the most relevant actor in local-level conflict resolution appears to be 
higher in areas closer to the original center of the precolonial kingdom than 
in other, more peripheral regions of the country.
Explanatory Variables
I want to investigate whether the response patterns of people within the cen-
ter of the precolonial kingdom really differ in a significant way from those of 
people in other areas of the country. To do so, I rely on the aforementioned 
ethnographic works on the precolonial kingdom to operationalize my main 
explanatory variable.
I first create a binary variable that spatially assigns each village in the 
sample to either the precolonial kingdom’s center or its periphery (see 
the dark-red zone in the middle of the map on the left side of Figure 4). 
The second indicator considers additional variation outside the kingdom’s 
center. On behalf of the king, the periphery was administered mainly by 
descendants of one of the two main aristocratic lineages, the Bezi and the 
Batare (Gahama, 1983). The Bezi controlled a north–south axis in the mid-
dle of the kingdom, whereas the Batare where dominant in the eastern 
periphery. In some mostly western and northern regions, power was trans-
ferred to local elites in families with past ties to the aristocracy or to those 
Figure 3. First actor that respondent would turn to in resource-related conflict: 
(a) distribution of response options (%) and (b) village average (bashingantahe first 
actor).
De Juan 1851
in families without any direct ties to the main royal lineages. I have created 
binary variables for the main zones of “sociopolitical proximity” to the 
kingdom’s center of power, namely, areas under control of families with-
out ties to the aristocracy, zones under control of the Batare and those 
regions controlled by the Bezi (Weilenmann, 1996).
The map on the right-hand side of Figure 4 displays the location of the 
kingdom’s main royal domains in the 19th century. I use each sampled vil-
lage’s distance to the nearest royal domain as a third explanatory variable. 
The main models presented below focus on the distinction between the king-
dom’s center and its periphery, while the results of the two alternative mea-
surements are presented in the “Robustness Checks” section.
Control Variables
I include a number of control variables in the model to consider potential 
alternative determinants of people’s assessment of traditional conflict-resolu-
tion institutions. First, I include two “historical controls” intended to capture 
pretreatment conditions before the establishment of the Burundian kingdom 
that may have affected the location of the royal domains and various current 
outcomes. As emphasized above, climatic conditions played a role in the for-
mation of the early kingdom. As climate data are not available for the 17th 
century, I proxy historical conditions with precipitation data for the period 
1950 to 2000 from the Worldclim data set. I also include dummy variables for 
respondents’ location within the former territory of the scattered political 
entities that preexisted the foundation of the kingdom of Burundi and were 
later partly integrated into the kingdom.
Figure 4. Location of the center of the precolonial kingdom.
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Next, I include two “colonial controls.” Precolonial institutions may have 
been able to remain stronger in regions that were less affected by colonial 
interventions. Moreover, such interventions may have been shaped by preco-
lonial institutional characteristics. I therefore control for administrative and 
missionary interventions. From 1929 on, the Belgian regime intervened mas-
sively into local political and social organization, replacing the majority of 
the established chiefs with others deemed more suitable and loyal to the colo-
nial administration. Chief replacements most often lead to the simultaneous 
ouster of associated local elites such as the so-called sous-chefs (secondary 
chiefs) and bashingantahe (Gahama, 1983). Gahama (1983) provides maps 
of the approximate locations of all individual chieftainships as well as the 
names of chiefs in power in 1929, 1933, 1937, 1945, and 1954. I have geore-
ferenced and digitized these maps. With this information, I have been able to 
attribute the total number of colonial interventions in terms of chief replace-
ments that took place in the area of each surveyed village across these five 
distinct periods of time.
The administrative reforms were accompanied by increasing missionary 
presence and activity. Missions had the explicit objectives of replacing tradi-
tional beliefs with Christian ones and of alienating people from precolonial 
power holders (Mvuyekure, 2003, p. 117). Given the comparatively low 
number of Protestant missionaries in Burundi, this function was mainly car-
ried out by the Catholic mission. To control for variation in exposure to mis-
sionary activity, I draw on information on the locations of Catholic missionary 
stations. The information stems from a map in the Atlas du Burundi 
(Association pour l’Atlas du Burundi, 1979) that displays missionary stations 
existent up to 1970, a few years after independence. I identify the nearest 
missionary station for all villages included in the survey. I use the distance to 
the nearest station to gauge exposure to missionary activity.
Finally, I include a number of “current controls” from the 2014 opinion 
survey. These are the usual demographic variables such as age (and age 
squared), gender, and two dummy variables for levels of education (no for-
mal education and completed primary education). I also include a dummy 
variable for self-reported civil-war exposure, an index of material asset pos-
session (additive: generator, car, motorbike, bicycle, television, radio) and a 
Likert-type scaled variable on self-reported material well-being to control for 
the possibility that people’s preferences in terms of institutional modes of 
conflict resolution are shaped by previous victimization or by their economic 
situation. I draw on the village-level survey to proxy state presence and 
accessibility of formal institutions of conflict resolution, in line with the 
alternative explanation for the persistence of traditional institutions presented 
above. I control for information on the travel distance to the nearest police 
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station, the nearest court of justice, the respective provincial capital, and the 
national capital Bujumbura.
Models and Results
To deal with a binary outcome variable, I use simple logistic regressions 
with standard errors clustered by province to account for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 2 summarizes the results (detailed tables including coefficients of all 
control variables are provided in the online appendix).
The first column presents the results of a simple bivariate model, compar-
ing interviewees’ responses within and outside the center of what was at one 
time the precolonial kingdom. The second model approximates a simple 
matching approach. Rather than comparing respondents across the country, I 
create a subsample including only respondents within and near (less than 10 
km from the outer limits of) the kingdom’s center. This helps me to implicitly 
control for factors that cluster spatially. The third model includes two “his-
torical” (pretreatment) controls. The fourth model adds controls for colonial 
interventions. The fifth model additionally includes control variables drawn 
from the individual and village-level surveys. In the final model, I also 
include province-level fixed effects to account for any unobserved variation 
Table 2. Correlation Between Location Within Royal Area and Role of 
Bashingantahe.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Total  
sample
Matched 
sample
Total 
sample
Total  
sample
Total 
sample
Total 
sample
Royal area 1.022*** 0.761* 0.765*** 0.805*** 0.867** 0.734†
 (0.246) (0.336) (0.231) (0.243) (0.289) (0.387)
Constant −1.682*** −1.421*** −3.224*** −2.608* −1.793 −3.681*
 (0.107) (0.249) (0.966) (1.186) (1.404) (1.468)
Historical controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colonial controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Current controls No No No No Yes Yes
Province fixed effects No No No No No Yes
  
Observations 1,500 315 1,500 1,500 1,477 1,477
AIC 1,362.812 354.549 1,337.325 1,339.035 1,326.541 1,307.643
BIC 1,373.439 362.054 1,374.517 1,386.854 1,437.794 1,487.767
Log likelihood −679.406 −175.275 −661.662 −660.518 −642.271 −619.821
Logit regressions, standard errors clustered on the province level; standard errors in parentheses.  
AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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across provinces. Most notably, this should help me account for any variation 
in the effectiveness of postcolonial administrative reforms that undermined 
the bashingantahe and strengthened formal state institutions of conflict reso-
lution. Models 3 to 5 should be interpreted with some caution. They include 
controls that have been measured posttreatment meaning that they are endog-
enous to precolonial institutions.
The results presented in Table 2 confirm the expected positive correlation 
between respondents’ location within the center of what was formerly the 
precolonial kingdom and their appraisal of the bashingantahe’s role in local-
level conflict resolution. Across all the models, I find a statistically signifi-
cant correlation in the expected direction. Proxies for colonial and postcolonial 
state presence and penetration fail to account for the variation in local-level 
conflict resolution. None of the variables considered turns out to be corre-
lated with modes of conflict resolution at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. Detailed results of the models are presented in the online appen-
dix (Table A1).
Due to the nonlinear nature of the specifications, we cannot judge the 
substantive significance of the associations. I therefore estimate the average 
marginal effects of the respondents’ location within the center of the precolo-
nial kingdom based on the likelihood that interviewees would first turn to the 
bashingantahe in cases of conflict over natural resources. Depending on the 
model, respondents within the center of what was the precolonial kingdom 
are 11% to 18% more likely to make use of precolonial conflict-resolution 
institutions than respondents in other regions of the country. The effect size 
of my main explanatory variable is barely affected by the inclusion of colo-
nial and current controls. It is only 1% to 2% lower than in models including 
historical controls only, making it appear implausible that precolonial topog-
raphies affected current modes of conflict resolution only by shaping colonial 
and postcolonial state building.
Robustness Checks
The correlations presented above lend support to the article’s main argument. 
To further scrutinize these results and address some of the shortcomings asso-
ciated with the specifications of the main models, I have implemented four 
robustness checks.
To further scrutinize whether my findings actually mirror the long-term 
effects of the precolonial state rather than other (random) spatial patterns in 
the data, I have randomly relocated the polygon representing the center of the 
precolonial kingdom. This has resulted in four new treatment and control 
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groups equaling the sample sizes of the original ones. I have estimated all the 
main models using these alternative explanatory variables. I do not find simi-
lar patterns of systematic variation of the outcome variable across treatment 
and control groups in any of them (see online appendix, Tables A2-A5).
Next, I have estimated models with alternative proxies for my main 
explanatory and outcome variables. I have reestimated models with the two 
alternative specifications of the explanatory variable outlined above: the role 
of precolonial sociopolitical hierarchies (online appendix, Table A6) and the 
distance to the nearest precolonial royal domain (online appendix, Table A7). 
I have also probed alternative outcome measures. I have first created an anal-
ogous binary variable that is positively coded if the bashingantahe is among 
the first three actors interviewees would turn to in cases of land conflict 
(online appendix, Table A8). Second, I have used people’s subjective assess-
ments of the bashingantahe’s contribution to the local security situation as an 
alternative outcome (online appendix, Table A9). All these specifications 
yield results that mirror the main findings presented above.
All the previous measurements of my outcome variable rely on individual 
assessments drawn from the household survey. Moreover, the previous mod-
els include only rather crude proxies for the features of the formal legal sys-
tem—namely, distances to courts and administrative centers—that may not 
do justice to the main state-based counterargument presented above. I rely on 
an additional data set to assess an alternative indicator of the social salience 
of the bashingantahe and to control for more nuanced characteristics of the 
formal legal system. A descriptive statistical overview of the Burundian judi-
cial system provided by Kohlhagen (2009b) contains rich information on the 
resources and practices of a sample of 51 of 129 communal courts (focusing 
on the period 2006-2008; the number of communal courts has changed since 
2009). I have geographically attributed the respective communes to either the 
center or the periphery of the precolonial kingdom. I rely on information on 
a specific legal practice as proxy for the social salience of the bashingantahe 
per commune: A legal reform implemented in 1987 stipulated that prior to 
submitting a case to the communal courts, litigants needed to submit their 
case to the bashingantahe. Only if the claimant did not agree with the solu-
tion proposed by the bashingantahe was he or she entitled to present the case 
to the court. Judges had to keep the minutes of the proposition made by the 
bashingantahe as part of the documentation of the case (Kohlhagen, 2009b; 
van Leeuwen & Haartsen, 2005). Although these specific requirements were 
formally abolished in 2005, many communal courts continue to voluntarily 
collect and document the minutes, indicating that solutions proposed by the 
bashingantahe are deemed particularly relevant in the respective regions 
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(Kohlhagen, 2009b). The share of cases with documentation containing these 
minutes serves as my alternative proxy.
Table 3 provides the results of linear regressions controlling for a number 
of court characteristics that more persuasively represent the capacity of the 
formal legal system than distances alone—namely, the number of judges per 
population, delays in court rulings, and delays in the enforcement of judg-
ments. The results lend further support to the argument that the precolonial 
topography plays an essential role in explaining the persistence of precolo-
nial conflict-resolution institutions: Courts within the former royal center 
have been collecting and archiving minutes of meetings with the bashingan-
tahe much more systematically than courts in the former periphery of the 
precolonial kingdom. This correlation is independent from the capacities and 
performance of the formal courts.
Table 3. Correlation Between Location Within Royal Area and Consultation 
With Bashingantahe.
(1) (2)
 OLS OLS fixed effects
Royal area 12.596*** 20.891***
 (1.903) (3.545)
Judges/population 0.749** 0.382
 (0.222) (0.334)
Litigations/population −0.016 −0.040*
 (0.013) (0.014)
Conflicts awaiting judgment −0.005 −0.011
 (0.009) (0.018)
Delays judgment execution −1.223 −1.173
 (1.102) (1.133)
Land conflicts/litigations 0.074 −0.084
 (0.183) (0.123)
Constant 13.492 33.059***
 (12.702) (6.839)
Province FE No Yes
  
Observations 49 49
R2 .334 .626
Standard errors clustered at the province level; standard errors in parentheses.  
OLS = ordinary least squares.
†p < .10. *p < .05.**p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Exploring the Mechanism
I have highlighted a norm-based explanation of the long-term transmission of 
precolonial political and cultural topographies in the Norm-based Arguments 
on Institutional Persistence and Change section. However, at least two other 
mechanisms may equally well explain the general correlations presented 
above: The bashingantahe may have survived as a consequence of active 
state promotion or because the institution represented an equilibrium of inter-
ests that prevented substantive institutional change. In this section, I will 
introduce both these alternative explanations and discuss their plausibility in 
the light of available qualitative and quantitative evidence.
Institutional Persistence as a Consequence of State Promotion
From the first alternative perspective, it may in fact have been the colonial 
and postcolonial states that contributed to preserving the precolonial institu-
tion. As argued above, both regimes as well as individual ruling parties have 
pursued a dual strategy of weakening and instrumentalizing the bashingan-
tahe. Attempts at integrating the bashingantahe into the state judiciary and 
using it as a political tool on the local level may have contributed to sustain-
ing it (for similar arguments in other contexts, see, for example, Boege, 
Brown, & Clements, 2009; Muriaas, 2011; Ntsebeza, 2004, 2005; Ribot, 
2002; Ubink, 2008). Potential spatial variation in the intensity of active pro-
motion may then explain geographical patterns of the present-day salience of 
the bashingantahe.
If this alternative argument would hold true in the case of Burundi, we 
would expect to see independent or conditional effects of state strength and/
or political party influence on the salience of the bashingantahe in the quan-
titative analysis: A positive correlation or interaction effect would reflect the 
assumption that the bashingantahe has been sustained were the state or ruling 
parties have been capable of effectively promoting it. A negative correlation 
or interaction effect would result from the state’s or parties’ promotion of the 
bashingantahe where own institutions and political influence were weak. I 
find little evidence for any direct or indirect effects of postcolonial state pres-
ence (see main effects in Table A1 and interaction effects in Tables A10 and 
A11) or party influence (using commune-level election results of Union for 
National Progress [Union pour le Progrès national, UPRONA] in 1993 and 
CNDD-FDD [Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces 
pour la Défense de la Démocratie] in 2010; see Tables A12-A15). Colonial 
missionary and administrative interventions, however, seem to mitigate 
the association between precolonial topographies and present-day conflict 
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resolution (see Tables A16 and A17). I turn to qualitative information to 
assess whether this finding does indeed reflect the consequences of deliberate 
attempts at strengthening the institution in areas of relative state weakness.
Colonial and postcolonial state policies toward the bashingantahe were 
highly inconsistent, oscillating between politicization, negligence, sidelin-
ing, and active suppression. Apart from short-lived phases of meaningful 
state promotion in the 1980s and 1990s, colonial and postcolonial attempts 
at integrating the bashingantahe into state and party structures were accom-
panied by even more pronounced measures, stripping the institution of its 
main functions (Deslaurier, 2003). The colonial Belgian administration was 
aware of the bashingantahe’s influence and systematically tried to under-
mine it (Laely, 1995). It therefore turned the institution into a subordinate 
state agent transferring its original competencies to newly created institu-
tions. The regime also broke with the tradition of community-based inves-
titures and turned toward top–down political appointment to detach the 
bashingantahe from local communities (Laely, 1995). The ruling UPRONA 
continued this approach transforming the bashingantahe from a locally 
rooted institution into a tool of the ruling party elite (Deslaurier, 2003; 
Dexter & Ntahombaye, 2005). Thus, overall qualitative studies strongly 
suggest that colonial and postcolonial policies have contributed to the bash-
ingantahe’s loss of responsibilities, influence, and acceptance rather than to 
its persistence (e.g., Dexter & Ntahombaye, 2005; Kohlhagen, 2009b; 
Laely, 1995). The observable interaction effects of colonial policies are, 
therefore, more likely to indicate that administrative interventions have 
affected interests and capabilities of influential elites (in line with the equi-
librium-based perspective; see below) and that missionary interventions 
have undermined norm transmission through education and proselytization 
(in line with the norm-based perspective).
Institutional Persistence as a Consequence of an Equilibrium of 
Interests
Norm-based arguments on institutional persistence are often contrasted with 
an equilibrium-based perspective (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Knill & Lenschow, 
2001; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 1999). The 
latter has its roots in a rational-choice approach: Institutions are created to 
serve the interests of actors and represent an equilibrium of their cumulative 
costs and benefits. Consequently, institutions persist as long as either a major-
ity of individuals and groups or particularly influential elites perceive of the 
costs of leaving the equilibrium as being higher as the potential benefits (Hall 
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& Taylor, 1996; Mahoney, 2000). Applied to the main research question of 
this article, one may argue that precolonial institutions were able to persist 
where they continued to be perceived by the local population and/or influen-
tial elites as the most beneficial arrangement.
Both, the equilibrium-based and the norm-based arguments are in line 
with the findings of the quantitative analysis presented above. I therefore 
need to identity additional empirical tests that generate evidence that is more 
compatible with the observable implications of one argument than with those 
of the other. I exploit variation in the duration of exposure to the precolonial 
state to provide for such a test. More specifically, I compare the effects of 
strong long-term exposure with the precolonial state with the effects of strong 
short-term exposure. The duration of exposure is essential from a norm-based 
perspective that highlights long-term processes of norm internalization. 
There is, however, little reason to believe that duration of exposure should 
matter from the equilibrium-based perspective that highlights the interests 
and capabilities of influential actors.
Relying on the ethnographic and historical sources introduced above, I 
have geolocated precolonial royal domains in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centu-
ries. I assigned all surveyed villages into three groups: (a) communities that 
have never been strongly exposed to the precolonial state (i.e., they have 
always been more than 10 km away from the nearest royal domain); (b) com-
munities that have been “newly” exposed in the 19th century but were apart 
from royal domains in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries (i.e., new royal 
domains were established within a radius of 10 km from these villages in the 
19th century); and (c) communities that have continuously been exposed to 
the colonial state throughout the entire precolonial period of the kingdom 
from the 16th to the 19th centuries (i.e., throughout this time period, royal 
domains were present within a 10-km radius from respective villages). 
Limiting the sample to these three groups, I have estimated effects of “new” 
exposure and continuous long-term exposure on the salience of the bashin-
gantahe. I find only the latter’s coefficients to be statistically significant (see 
Table A18), lending support to the norm-based explanation of institutional 
stickiness: Norms of conflict resolution have only taken root where the pre-
colonial state had been in existence for an extended period of time. I now turn 
to qualitative information to further scrutinize both arguments.
Careful qualitative analyses consistently stress that the institution of the 
bashingantahe has profoundly changed as a consequence of colonial and 
postcolonial interventions. Most notably processes of training, selection, and 
investiture were undermined and adapted over time reshaping the institu-
tional manifestation of the bashingantahe (for similar arguments in other 
contexts, see Davidson & Henley, 2007; Moore, 1986). Most influential elites 
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who originally enforced and sustained the institution were forcefully 
replaced—not only in the center of the kingdom but eventually across all of 
its territory. Regime transitions also substantially influenced local elites’ alle-
giances, incentive structures, and capabilities (Laely, 1995). As a conse-
quence, costs and benefits associated with the institution of the bashingantahe 
changed relative to newly created colonial and postcolonial institutions. 
From a purely equilibrium-focused perspective, macropolitical changes and 
their effects on actors’ cost–benefit calculations led to the erosion and even-
tual abandonment of the bashingantahe in favor of a new equilibrium deemed 
more advantageous for influential actors and/or the population at large.
Although the formal and material foundations of the precolonial kingdom 
have been abolished, the locations, principles, and beliefs of the precolonial 
cultural and political system remained deeply rooted in people’s collective 
memory (Ntabona, 2002). It has been highlighted that geographic character-
istics of the country have been particularly conducive to this preservation: 
Socialization has been strongly circumscribed to individual collines leading 
to a particularly homogenized and effective internalization (Laely, 1995). 
Fieldwork and survey-based research shows that the bashingantahe survived 
as a specific principle that continues to determine to a great extent the expec-
tations people have of one another and of the “right” ways of settling con-
flicts (Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, 2012; Uvin, 2008). Thus, the bashingantahe’s 
influence is not based on people’s rational assessment of the potential conse-
quences of defiance but on the internalization of the underlying values and 
principles. It is the “the fear of being marginalized or, simply, being consid-
ered ridiculous” that makes people turn to the bashingantahe rather than to 
other institutions (Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, 2012).
Generalizability
In how far can the general findings of this study be transferred to other cases? 
Similar analyses in other country contexts are needed to assess generalizabil-
ity. Such an extended analysis is beyond the scope of this article. I instead 
assess the plausibility of a key observable implication of my main argument 
in a larger set of countries. As argued above, my hypothesis rests on the 
assumption that strong and concentrated precolonial political systems foster 
the enculturation of norms that, in turn, allow precolonial institutions to per-
sist. If this would hold true beyond the case of Burundi, I should be able to 
observe—across country contexts—that the present-day salience of precolo-
nial institutions is stronger in areas that were formally part of compact and 
centralized precolonial states.
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For this analysis, I draw on replication data by Nunn and Wantchekon 
(2011) that have attributed respondents of the 2005 round of the Afrobarometer 
survey to settlement areas of ethnic groups included in the Murdock data set 
introduced above. I add an additional variable from the Afrobarometer survey 
to gauge my outcome variable: “During the past year, how often have you 
contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to 
give them your views: A traditional ruler?” I create a binary variable differ-
entiating respondents who have not contacted a traditional ruler (77%) and 
those who have contacted a ruler at least once (23%). As my main explana-
tory variable, I use the binary measure for centralized precolonial entities 
with compact and relatively permanent settlements introduced above. Similar 
to my main analysis, I consider only rural areas, leaving me with around 
12,000 respondents in 17 sub-Saharan countries. Results of simple bivariate 
logistic regression with and without country-level fixed effects lend some 
initial support to the assumption, that traditional institutions are more likely 
to remain socially salient within the territories of centralized and compact 
precolonial states. These findings do not, of course, allow me to make strong 
claims on the applicability of my argument to other cases. They show, how-
ever, that the underlying assumption of my hypothesis is plausible in a wider 
context beyond the single case of Burundi: Precolonial social and political 
conditions can in fact continue to shape people’s institutional choices.
Conclusion
There is still little knowledge about the conditions behind the persistence of 
precolonial institutions. This article has suggested and empirically investi-
gated an argument highlighting the internalization and enculturation of pre-
colonial modes of dispute settlement.
In many parts of Burundi, precolonial institutions remain the primary 
framework for local-level conflict resolution. In other regions, traditional dis-
pute settlement has largely lost its social significance. This article’s empirical 
analyses demonstrate that precolonial political topographies are a much bet-
ter predictor of these geographical patterns than the spatial features of pres-
ent-day Burundian state presence and capacity. Precolonial institutions have 
been able to persist in the former political and cultural centers of the king-
dom, where the associated norms have been internalized and enculturated 
over a period of more than three centuries. Although the case of Burundi is 
specific in a number of respects, additional analyses indicate that similar 
dynamics may be at play in other country contexts.
These findings provide several important insights: First, they highlight 
and specify the historical sources of local conflict-resolution capacity in the 
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highly relevant context of land conflict, informing programs intended to 
revive or strengthen traditional forms of dispute settlement. Second, they 
may contribute to understanding the background of uneven state building in 
many developing countries: The success of states’ attempts to enforce formal 
judicial institutions uniformly across their territories is not just a matter of 
state capacity and state presence but also depends on the salience of compet-
ing institutions that draw their strength and resilience from precolonial times. 
Third, adding to a growing body of work on the long-term economic effects 
of precolonial institutions, the analysis demonstrates how precolonial politi-
cal entities can also continue to shape present-day political and social out-
comes by functioning as the source of salient social norms. This may be 
relevant beyond conflict resolution in a narrower sense. Subsequent studies 
might possibly analyze whether the topographies of precolonial political enti-
ties affect current variations in other social and political conditions such as 
social capital, religious beliefs, or state–society relations more generally.
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Notes
1. Institutions can be understood as the “rules of the game”—they constrain human 
behavior, and thereby structure human interactions (North, 1990). I use the terms 
traditional institutions and precolonial institutions interchangeably for those 
rules that have developed independently, without importation from the out-
side, and that have been practiced for an extended period of time (Boege, 2006; 
Zartman, 2000).
2. More skeptical voices make the critique that exclusionary traditional norms 
contradict universal human rights and stress that their persistence prevents the 
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entrenchment of formal state institutions (Barron, Kaiser, & Pradhan, 2009; 
Beall, Mkhize, & Vawda, 2005; van Donge & Pherani, 1999).
3. http://ufdc.ufl.edu/derscheid
4. The latter finding contradicts the assumption that areas within the precolonial 
kingdom were treated differently by the Belgian administration in terms of inter-
ventions into local governance. Additional information from the data set indi-
cates that the strongest predictor of chief replacement was previous disciplinary 
punishment.
5. The survey took place within the framework of a project funded by the German 
Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as well 
as the German Development Bank (KfW). Data collection was undertaken by a 
local commercial firm, Development Through Expert Consultancy (DevEC).
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